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Disaffected youth are among the most susceptible in espousing and acting on extremist ideals, as
confirmed by demographic studies. To study age-dependent radicalization we introduce a three-
stage model where individuals progress through non-radical, activist, and radical states, while also
aging. Transitions between stages are modeled as age-dependent interactions that are maximized
for individuals of the same age and that are enhanced at early adulthood. For comparison, we also
derive the age-independent formulation corresponding to the full age-dependent model. We find that
age-dependence leads to more complex dynamics, enhancing radicalization in certain parameter
regimes. We also observe waves of radical behavior ebbing and flowing over generational cycles,
realizing well known paradigms in political science. While government intervention is most effective
when the appropriate ages are targeted, deciding whether preventive or corrective action is preferable
depends on the aggressiveness of the radicalization process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding why and how individuals adopt extremist views has become a prime focus for governments and
society. The process commonly known as “radicalization” is gradual, unfolds through several phases, and may be
strongly influenced by social, economic and cultural factors [1–4]. The making of a radical often starts from a
state of discontent and feelings of alienation. Mainstream political, social, or religious tenets are gradually rejected
and replaced by alternate and increasingly extreme ideologies [5–8]. As new ideals become entrenched, a phase of
intolerance towards the beliefs, identities, and lifestyles of “others” ensues, accompanied by a proselytizing push [9].
Finally, radicalization may culminate with the execution of violent, self-destructive acts aimed at spreading terror
and damage [10, 11]. Although the boundaries between the above described stages are somewhat fluid, we may
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2succinctly describe radicalization as a sequence of pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, commitment
and jihadization steps; each being marked by an increasing level of fanaticism [12–17].
Radical tendencies can arise at any age and factors that are traditionally associated with desistance from deviant
behavior, such as marriage, career and education, are not always sufficient deterrents against extremism [7, 18].
Disenfranchised young adults, however, are particularly vulnerable to indoctrination and radicalization, especially
when their formative years are spent without purpose, education or positive role models [11, 19]. Joining extremist
groups can provide a sense of belonging and a haven where ideals are shared with like minded individuals [18, 20–23].
Today, this is sometimes the case for marginalized immigrant or second-generation youth in western cities, for those
growing up in refugee camps, and for right-wing extremists [8, 24]. Lacking prospects or motivation, an aversion for
the majority and a desire to undermine authority gradually takes root with radicalism providing a sense of purpose
and community.
Several mathematical models have been proposed to describe radicalization, both as a general phenomenon [25–28],
and as applied to actual situations, such as the emergence of separatist movements in the Basque country [29], or of
right-wing groups in Germany [30]. These models include temporal and in some cases spatial patterns of populations
evolving through stages of increasing fanaticism [18, 22, 23, 31]. In some instances field data was used to recapitulate
violent incidents that were later used for parameter estimation [32]. Despite the many useful insights provided,
none of these studies include age-sensitive responses to propaganda, emulation of peers and societal pressure. As
described above, radicalization is highly age-dependent and developing age-structured models may shed new light on
the mechanisms that lead to the establishment of radical groups and help identify optimal intervention strategies.
In this paper we propose an age-structured model for radicalization where a sequence of stages marked by increasing
fanaticism is coupled with age-differentiated interactions. Age dependence intensifies interactions among peers, en-
hancing the progression towards extremist behavior. Our results suggest that conventional age-dependent population
models may oversimplify the complexity of social interactions. In some parameter regimes, we find that age-structure
leads to enhanced radicalization, and that for societies that are highly prone to irreversible radicalization, generational
cycles of extremism may arise, realizing a well known paradigm in political science of alternating decades of ebbing and
flowing radicalization [33]. We also study the effects of government intervention and find that strategically focusing
resources on specific age ranges may lead to optimal results.
II. THE MODEL
Several classifications have been introduced in the literature to describe the number of stages between pre-
radicalization and full fledged extremism [2, 3, 7, 12–16]. In this work, for simplicity, we consider three distinct
stages of fanaticism labeled as i = 0, 1, 2. The first i = 0 stage is that of pre-radicalization, where individuals do not
respond to extreme ideologies and are referred to as “non-radicals.” Upon being exposed to radical ideas, non-radicals
may choose to espouse them, become “activists,” and recruit others to their newly found ideology. This intermediate
i = 1 state corresponds to self-identification and early indoctrination. Finally, i = 2 is the last stage whereby ac-
tivists turn into “radicals” who embrace violence to further their cause. The transitions among the three stages are
illustrated in Fig. 1.
To introduce an age-structure we define non-radical, activist and radical population densities ρi(t, a) of age a at
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FIG. 1: Illustration of the population exchange among non-radicals ρ0, activists ρ1, and radicals ρ2. Activation and radical-
ization are assumed to occur through social interactions between converting and converted population fractions. De-activation
and pacification are proportional to the converted population fractions.
time t. Transitions from the non-radical i = 0 to the activist i = 1 pool for individuals of age a are mediated by the
activation rate A(a; ρ1) which we assume depends on a and on the age-structure of the influencing pool ρ1. Similarly,
transitions from the activist i = 1 to the radical i = 2 population at age a are driven by the radicalization rate
R(a; ρ2). We finally include a de-activation rate CD that leads individuals to regress from i = 1 to i = 0 and a
pacifying rate CP for individuals to revert from i = 2 to i = 1. Both CD and CP could be age structured, but we
keep them uniform for simplicity. Numerical studies with monotonically increasing CD(a) and CP(a) do not yield
qualitatively different results and are not shown here. We write our model as
∂ρ0
∂t
+
∂ρ0
∂a
= −A(a; ρ1)ρ0 + CDρ1, (1)
∂ρ1
∂t
+
∂ρ1
∂a
= A(a; ρ1)ρ0 − [CD +R(a; ρ2)] ρ1 +
CPρ2. (2)
∂ρ2
∂t
+
∂ρ2
∂a
= R(a; ρ2)ρ1 − CPρ2. (3)
Eqs. 1 – 3 are of the McKendrick-von Foerster type [34–39], where the left-hand side is the total time derivative
d/dt = ∂/∂t+ (∂a/∂t) ∂/∂a. Provided that age and time are measured in the same unit, ∂a/∂t = 1, and the ∂/∂a term is
associated to “aging”. The transition rates A(a; ρ1) and R(a; ρ2) on the right-hand side depend explicitly on age and
are defined as
A(a; ρ1) = CA
∫ a1
a0
K(a, a′;αA, σA) ρ1(t, a
′)da′, (4)
R(a; ρ2) = CR
∫ a1
a0
K(a, a′;αR, σR) ρ2(t, a
′)da′. (5)
Eqs. 4 and 5 indicate that all individuals between ages a0 and a1 are able to influence those at age a via the “interaction
kernels” K(a, a′, αj , σj) that we model as
4K(a, a′;αj , σj) =
exp
[
−
(a− αj)
2 + (a− a′)2
2σ2j
]
∫ a¯
−a¯
exp
[
−
s2
σ2j
]
ds
(6)
for j = A,R, where a¯ ≡ |a1 − a0|. The kernels specify how an individual at age a is influenced by another at age a
′.
Eq. 6 is defined so that if ρ1(t, a
′) in Eq. 4 is age-independent, then A(a; ρ1) → CA and similarly if ρ2(t, a
′) is age-
independent, then R(a; ρ2)→ CR. The kernels are maximized when a = αj and when a = a
′. The former condition
expresses that individuals are most susceptible to activation and radicalization when they are at certain “target” ages
αj (j = A,R). The latter condition arises from “peer-to-peer” interactions, whereby individuals are most influenced
by those of similar age. Eq. 4 decreases as a shifts away from αj and when the age gap |a− a
′| increases. How quickly
these kernels decline is specified by σj (j = A,R), the spread of the interaction kernel. If σj is large, the influence
exerted by individuals at age a′ on those at age a may persist for large age differences |a′ − a|, and for large |a− αj |.
Conversely, for small σj the kernels will be appreciable only for a ∼ a
′ and a ∼ αj . Furthermore, with Eq. 4 we assume
that activation (i = 0 to i = 1) occurs through age-dependent social interactions between the ρ0 non-radical and the
activist ρ1 populations; a similar construct holds for radicalization (i = 1 to i = 2) in Eq. 5 through which the ρ1
activists interact with the ρ2 radicals. We will study the model defined by Eqs. 1–6 for a typical age span of [a0, a1],
so that a¯ ≡ a1 − a0 in the denominator of Eq. 6. The latter is introduced to guarantee that upon integration over
[a0, a1] the kernels are independent of σj. This will be useful when deriving the age-independent version of Eqs. 1–6,
since the denominator will yield age-independent transition rates that depend only on the Cj amplitudes and not on
σj . It is important to note that the presence of the denominator implies that the total area under the kernel is unity;
kernels with a higher σj will be wider but shallower than kernels with a lower σj .
The chosen [a0, a1] boundaries specify the range for effective age-based interactions: individuals of age a < a0 are
too young to influence or be influenced by an ideology or by their peers, those with age a > a1 may be too old or
entrenched for change. The age boundaries also imply that Eqs. 1-6 represent radicalization across a single generation,
beginning at a0 and ending at a1. For simplicity we assume that within [a0, a1] death is negligible. To complete our
model we must include boundary conditions which are chosen at a = a0 as
ρ0(t, a0) =
∑
i=0,1,2
ρi(t, a1), (7)
ρ1(t, a0) = ρ2(t, a0) = 0. (8)
The above conditions imply that the total population exiting from age a = a1, including radicals, activists and
non-radicals, will re-enter the system at age a0 as non-radical. The model is now complete as Eqs. 1-3 are advection-
reaction equations that require boundary conditions only on one side of the domain. Our basic assumption is that at
each i = 0, 1, 2 stage the population is large and stochastic effects can be neglected, justifying the use of deterministic,
mean-field McKendrick-von Foerster type equations [34–39]. We also neglect birth and death events for simplicity,
assuming a constant total population and focusing on how this constant population is distributed across ages and
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FIG. 2: Reversible radicalization phase portraits derived from Eqs. 13 and 14 for three values of cD and fixed cP = 0.5,
cA = cR = 1. The magnitude of the phase flow v ≡ (dn0/dt,dn2/dt) is color-coded. (a) For cD/cA > 1 all trajectories converge
to the stable fixed point at (n∗0, n
∗
2) = (1, 0) denoted by a solid circle. (b) For 1− cP/cR < cD/cA ≤ 1 the stable fixed point is
(n∗0, n
∗
2) = (cD/cA, 0) while (1, 0) turns unstable and is denoted by an open circle. (c) Finally, for cD/cA ≤ 1− cP/cR the sole
stable solution is (n∗0, n
∗
2) = (cD/cA, 1− cD/cA − cP/cR), while the other two are unstable. The regions above n0 + n2 = 1 are
unphysical as 0 ≤ ni ≤ 1 for i = 0, 1, 2 by construction.
radicalization stages in response to different social interaction mechanisms.
Finally, we introduce the size of the population at stage i between ages a1 and a2 at time t as Ni(t; [a1, a2]) ≡∫ a2
a1
ρi(t, a)da, a quantity that will be invoked in the next section. Unless otherwise stated we will consider initial
conditions such that ρ0(0, a) ≫ ρ1(0, a) ≃ ρ2(0, a) > 0, to mimic a society where the majority of the population is
initially non-radical. Note that because of the structure of Eqs. 1-3, ρ1(0, a) and ρ2(0, a) must be non-zero to induce
activation and radicalization.
III. RESULTS
We begin by deriving the age-independent equations corresponding to Eqs. 1–3. These will give us a benchmark
against which the full, age-structured model will be later compared and contrasted to. What we will obtain is an
ODE system where kernels and transition rates are condensed in an age-uniform quantity. Comparing results from
both formulations will be useful to understand what features we fail to capture when neglecting age-structure.
A. Age-independent model and stationary solutions
To construct the age-independent version of our model we define the fractional populations ni(t) as
ni(t) ≡
∫ a1
a0
ρi(t, a)da∑
i=0,1,2
Ni(t; [a0, a1])
(9)
where the denominator N ≡
∑
i=0,1,2Ni(t; [a0, a1]) represents the entire population between ages a0 and a1. The
resulting N is time independent due to population conservation. By construction 0 ≤ ni(t) ≤ 1 for all i and∑
i=0,1,2 ni(t) = 1. We now let σj → ∞ in Eq. 6 for j = A,R. The interaction kernels become constants and
6the age-independent transition rates can be rewritten as A(ρ1) = CA
∫ a1
a0
ρ1(t, a)da/(2a¯) = NCAn1(t)/(2a¯), and
R(ρ1) = CR
∫ a1
a0
ρ2(t, a)da/(2a¯) = NCRn2(t)/(2a¯). Finally, integrating Eqs. 1–3 over the ages between a0 and a1 and
dividing the results by N we find that the interactions factor as
dn0
dt
= −cAn0n1 + cDn1, (10)
dn1
dt
= cAn0n1 − cDn1 − cRn1n2 + cPn2, (11)
dn2
dt
= cRn1n2 − cPn2, (12)
where cA ≡ NCA/(2a¯), cR ≡ NCR/(2a¯), cD ≡ CD, and cP ≡ CP. Note that there is no equivalent to the boundary
conditions Eqs. 7 and 8 since we integrated out age-dependence. Eqs. 10–12 form a degenerate system, which, by
substituting n1 = 1− n0 − n2, reduces to
dn0
dt
= (1− n0 − n2) (cD − cAn0) , (13)
dn2
dt
= n2 [cR (1− n0 − n2)− cP] . (14)
The model defined by Eqs. 13 and 14 is similar to previous multi-compartment models where extremism increases due
to interactions between radicals and non-radicals [25, 28, 30]. By invoking the Bendixson-Dulac theorem [40, 41] with
1/ [n2 (1− n0 − n2)] as the Dulac function, it can be shown that limit cycles do not arise. All trajectories converge to
fixed points (n∗0, n
∗
2) as shown in Figs. 2 and 3. Note that all fixed points must satisfy the constraint 0 ≤ n
∗
i ≤ 1 for
all i. Sociologically, within some radical groups pacification may be rare due to extreme die-hard fanaticism, while
in other groups gradually retracting from radicalization may be possible. The reversibility of the final, radical stage
(i.e., whether cP = 0 or cP > 0) plays a key role in determining qualitative behaviors as observed in opinion dynamics
models [42, 43]. Hence in analyzing Eqs. 13 and 14 we consider two distinct cases: reversible radicalization, whereby
cP > 0, and irreversible radicalization, whereby cP = 0.
If cP > 0 and radicalization is reversible, a maximum of three fixed points may arise, as shown in Figs. 2(a)–
(c). The fixed point at (n∗0 = 1, n
∗
2 = 0) (and n
∗
1 = 0), where all individuals are non-radical. This fixed point
corresponds to “utopia”, a society without any activists or radicals. The second fixed point is the “dormant” state
(n∗0 = cD/cA, n
∗
2 = 0) (and n
∗
1 = 1− cD/cA), characterized by the presence of activists who do not turn radical. Here
the non-radical population n∗0 is given by balancing the cD de-activation-induced influx and the cA activation-induced
efflux, yielding n∗0 = cD/cA. Finally, the third “turmoil” fixed point is at (n
∗
0 = cD/cA, n
∗
2 = 1 − cD/cA − cP/cR)
(and n∗1 = cP/cR), where a non-zero fraction of the population is permanently radicalized. While the fraction of the
non-radical population is again given by n∗0 = cD/cA, the activist population is similarly determined by balancing
the cP pacification-induced influx and the radicalization-induced efflux cR, yielding n
∗
1 = cP/cR. The existence and
stability of these fixed points depend on the values of cD/cA and cP/cR as well as whether they satisfy the 0 ≤ n
∗
i ≤ 1
constraints.
When de-activation dominates activation and cD/cA > 1 utopia is the only feasible steady state. The phase
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FIG. 3: Irreversible radicalization phase portraits derived from Eqs. 13 and 14 for three sets of (cD, cR) and fixed cP = 0,
cA = 1. A family of solutions n
∗
0 +n
∗
2 = 1 (depicted in magenta) arises in addition to the three fixed points. (a) For cD/cA > 1,
the solution family and so the fixed point (1, 0) are marginally stable. (b)–(c) For cD/cA ≤ 1, the portion of the solution
family that satisfies n∗0 > (cD + cR)/(cA + cR) becomes unstable (dashed magenta line), along with the fixed points (1, 0) and
(cD/cA, 0). The remainder of the solution family and the fixed point (cD/cA, 1− cD/cA) are marginally stable (solid magenta
line). In panel (b) where cR = 1.0 the stable portion of the solution family is larger than in panel (c) where cR = 0.1. Phase
flows steer trajectories towards the solution family, avoiding the stable fixed point. A trajectory starting near (1, 0) and ending
at (cD/cA, 1− cD/cA) is depicted in panel (c) as a black dashed curve. Other trajectories may end anywhere along the stable
portion of the solution family.
portrait of the system is shown in Fig. 2(a): all trajectories converge to (1, 0). Upon increasing activation so that
1 − cP/cR < cD/cA ≤ 1, the dormant state enters the physical domain and becomes the only stable solution. The
phase portrait in Fig. 2(b) shows that all trajectories converge to (cD/cA, 0), while (1, 0) becomes a saddle point.
Finally, when activation dominates de-activation and cD/cA ≤ 1 − cP/cR, turmoil replaces the dormant state as the
only stable solution. Fig. 2(c) shows all trajectories converging to (cD/cA, 1 − cD/cA − cP/cR) while the other two
fixed points become saddle nodes.
Under irreversible radicalization, when cP = 0, in addition to the above fixed points, a family of solutions n
∗
0 +
n∗2 = 1 (and n
∗
1 = 0) will arise. This follows from the irreversible nature of radicalization: in the absence of
a pacification mechanism the n2 radical group becomes a sink, eventually depleting the n1 activist pool. As a
consequence, population exchanges between n0 and n2 are interrupted, stranding phase trajectories along the n
∗
0+n
∗
2 =
1 line. Note that when cP = 0, the stability interval for the dormant state, 1 − cP/cR < cD/cA ≤ 1 vanishes, so that
the dormant state is always unstable. Under irreversible radicalization, increases in cA shift the system from utopia
directly to turmoil.
In Fig. 3(a) we plot the phase portrait for cD/cA > 1; the fixed point (1, 0) and the solution family n
∗
0 + n
∗
2 = 1
are both marginally stable. In Figs. 3(b) and (c) we set cD/cA ≤ 1 and consider different values of cR. In both
figures, the fixed point (cD/cA, 1− cD/cA) is marginally stable while (1, 0) is unstable. The segments of the so-
lution family n∗0 + n
∗
2 = 1 between (1, 0) (open circle) and ((cD + cR)/(cA + cR), 1− (cD + cR)/(cA + cR)) (open
star) become unstable. Due to the irreversibility of radicalization the dynamics are highly sensitive to initial con-
ditions; where a trajectory will end along the stable portion of the n∗0 + n
∗
2 = 1 line depends on where the trajec-
tory starts. An important role is also played by the radicalization rate cR. As the latter increases, the open star
((cD + cR)/(cA + cR), 1− (cD + cR)/(cA + cR)) will shift towards (1, 0), expanding the stable portion of the solution
family. Larger cR values, as shown in Fig. 3(c), enhance the stability of the solution family, as trajectories are steered
8more vigorously towards n∗0 + n
∗
2 = 1, before turmoil can be reached.
The above analysis reveals that three steady states are possible within the age-independent formulation of model:
utopia, a dormant state, and turmoil, as summarized in Fig. 4. Under reversible radicalization, the system settles into
one of the three depending on the values of cD/cA and cP/cR, while for irreversible radicalization the final steady
state also depends on initial conditions.
cD/cA
c
P
/c
R
0 1 2
0
1
2
utopia
dormant
state
turmoil
c
D /c
A + c
P /c
R
 = 1
FIG. 4: Phase diagram of the age-independent model under reversible radicalization. For cD ≥ cA, the system settles at utopia
(n∗0 = 1, n
∗
1 = 0, n
∗
2 = 0). For cD < cA and cD/cA+cP/cR ≥ 1, the dormant state is stable at (n
∗
0 = cD/cA, n
∗
1 = 1−cD/cA, n
∗
2 =
0). For cD/cA + cP/cR < 1, the system is in turmoil at (n
∗
0 = cD/cA, n
∗
1 = cP/cR, n
∗
2 = 1− cD/cA − cP/cR).
B. Full age-dependent model
We now consider the full age-dependent model as defined in Eqs. 1–6, starting with the scenario of reversible radical-
ization, CP > 0. As shown in Fig. 2 the corresponding age-dependent model progresses through the utopia, dormant,
and turmoil steady states as cD decreases. In order to compare results, we begin by examining the steady states
arising from the age-dependent model by varying CD while fixing other parameters. We assume the radicalization
window to occur between ages a0 = 5 and a1 = 55; to include age dependence we must also specify αj and σj . For
simplicity we assume the same age dependence for activation and radicalization, setting αA = αR = 20 years, and
σA = σR = 10 years. We assume initial conditions ρ0(a, 0) = 0.989, ρ1(a, 0) = 0.01, and ρ2(a, 0) = 0.001, representing
an overwhelmingly non-radical society. Finally, we choose CA = CR = 2, CP = 0.5. The initial conditions yield a
total population N = a¯, leading to the corresponding parameter values cA = cR = 1, cP = 0.5 for the age-independent
model, which are exactly the same values used in Fig. 2. Since cD = CD we finally select CD = 2, 0.6, and 0.2, so
that full comparisons can be made with Fig. 2 and the implications of including age dependence in the model can be
highlighted. Within the age-dependent scenario analytical estimates of steady states are not available and numerical
simulations must be run for every set of chosen parameters. Henceforth, all times and age units will be assumed to
be years. All main parameters and terms are summarized in Table I.
In Fig. 5, we numerically evaluate Eqs. 1–6 for t = 100 and plot the n1(t) activist and n2(t) radical populations as
defined by Eqs. 9. For comparison, we also show the corresponding age-independent n1(t), n2(t) populations obtained
from Eqs. 10–12 where initial conditions were specified as n0(0) = 0.989, n1(0) = 0.01, and n2(0) = 0.001 for
consistency. For CD = 2 the age-independent model predicts utopia, a result that is confirmed in the age-dependent
9Symbol Description Values
A(a; ρ1) activation rate coefficient Eq. (4)
R(a; ρ2) radicalization rate coefficient Eq. (5)
G government conversion rate coefficient Eq. (22)
CA activation intensity 1 – 12
CR radicalization intensity 0 – 20
CD de-activation intensity 0.2 – 5
CP pacification intensity 0 – 0.5
CG government intervention intensity 0 - 5
αA activation targeted age 20 ys.
αR radicalization targeted age 20 ys.
αG government targeted age 20 ys.
a0 lower bound of interaction age window 5 ys.
a1 upper bound of interaction age window 55 ys.
σA activation age breadth 10 ys.
σR radicalization age breadth 10 ys.
σG government intervention age breadth 10 ys.
µ fraction of intervention on activists 0 – 1
TABLE I: List of parameters and functional forms used in the model presented in Eqs. 1–6. Government intervention quantities
are discussed in Section IV.
case. We do not plot the dynamics corresponding to this case, since both n1(t) and n2(t) quickly vanish in both
formulations. For CD = 0.6, Fig. 5(a) shows that a small but nonzero radical fraction n2(t → ∞) emerges within
the age-dependent model, in contrast to the age-independent prediction of a dormant state whereby n∗2 = 0. This
discrepancy is due to age-enhancement of the activation A(a; ρ1) and radicalization R(a; ρ2) rates near the early ages
a ≃ αj for j = A,R respectively. Recall, that by construction, and as discussed when justifying the shape of the
sensitivity kernels in Eq. 6, enhancing the transition rates at a given age, necessarily decreases them at other age
intervals. Here, increasing the transition rates around αj is sufficient to drive the system towards turmoil, despite the
same transition rates being lowered in other age windows.
Finally, for CD = 0.2 both the age-dependent and age-independent models reach turmoil as shown in Fig. 5(b).
Note that the steady-state activist and radical fractions arising from the age-dependent model, n1(t → ∞) = 0.36
and n2(t → ∞) = 0.21 are lower than the predicted n
∗
1 = 0.5 and n
∗
2 = 0.3 values in the age-independent case; this
is due to the age-structure of the kernel in Eq. 6. In the age-independent case, where the transition rates cA and cR
are not age-structured, the chosen parameters lead to turmoil where only a relatively small population is non-radical:
n∗0 = 1− n
∗
1 − n
∗
2 = 0.2. The age-dependent formulation allows for age variability in the transition rates A(a; ρ1) and
R(a; ρ2), which increase at the peak ages αA and αR, but decrease for other ages. The local increases in A(a ≃ αA; ρ1)
and R(a ≃ αR; ρ2) do not appreciably raise the number of activists or radicals compared to those in the turmoil state
of the age-independent formulation, since they are already sustained. Decreasing the transitions in other age-windows,
however, stymies the radicalization of other individuals far from the peak age, resulting in an overall net decrease of
the radical and activist populations so that n1(t→∞) < n
∗
1 and n2(t→∞) < n
∗
2.
In Fig. 5(c) we select CA = CR = 2, CD = 0.9, and CP = 0.05 to yield the age-independent, turmoil steady state
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FIG. 5: Time dependence of the the activist n1 and radical n2 population fractions from the age-independent and age-
dependent formulations of our model. We fix CA = CR = 2 in all panels and set CD = 0.6 and CP = 0.5 in panel (a); CD = 0.2
and CP = 0.5 in panel (b) and CD = 0.8 and CP = 0.1 in panel (c). Additional parameters for the age-dependent model
are set to αA = αR = 20, σA = σR = 10. Initial conditions are (ρ0(a, 0), ρ1(a, 0), ρ2(a, 0)) = (0.989, 0.01, 0.001). In panel
(a), age dependence allows a small fraction of radicals to rise, while the age-independent model predicts a dormant state at
(n∗0 = 0.6, n
∗
1 = 0.4, n
∗
2 = 0). In panels (b) and (c), both models evolve towards turmoil. In panel (b) the age-independent
model predicts aggressive radicalization with turmoil at (n∗0 = 0.2, n
∗
1 = 0.5, n
∗
2 = 0.3); including age-structure leads to a
lower radical fraction. Radicalization is less aggressive in panel (c). Here, the age-independent turmoil steady state is at
(n∗0 = 0.9, n
∗
1 = 0.05, n
∗
2 = 0.05) and age dependence increases the radical population. Note that in all panels, age dependence
accelerates activist and radical growth, regardless of the final steady states.
(n∗0 = 0.9, n
∗
1 = 0.05, n
∗
2 = 0.05), with a large non-radical population. In the age-dependent model, enhanced rates at
the peak ages αA and αR allow for the transition of a much larger non-radical population into the activist and radical
pools, compared to the case discussed in Fig. 5(c) where the non-radical population was small. Overall, a larger value
for n2(t → ∞) = 0.11 is observed in the age-dependent formulation than in the age-independent one. Note that in
both Figs. 5(b) and (c), activists and radicals emerge earlier in the age-dependent than in the age-independent model,
regardless of the final steady-state. This trait persists for several parameter choices, suggesting that age-structured
rates accelerate radicalization, due to their enhancement at young ages.
In Fig. 6 we plot the age-structured distributions for activists and radicals ρ1(a, t → ∞) and ρ2(a, t → ∞) as
approximated at t = 100 after steady state has been reached. In Fig. 6(a) we use the same parameters as in Fig. 5(a)
where the age-independent model predicts a dormant state. Here, the age-structured steady state population is mostly
in the activist state, peaking at age a ≃ 21, although a small fraction of radicals ρ2(a, t→∞) emerges and peaks at
age a ≃ 23, due to the locally increased transition rates, as described above. Note that the maximum in ρ1(a, t→∞)
occurs at age a∗ > αA. This can be explained by noting that the greatest transition towards the activist state occurs
at age αA, when the sensitivity kernel K(a, a
′, αA, σα) reaches its maximum. The individuals who joined the activist
group at age αA will age and remain, at least for some time, in this state before transitioning to the radical or non-
radical states for ages a > αA. Additional individuals will join the activist pool at older ages, yielding a cumulative
activist population that is greatest for a∗ > αA, as ρ1(a
∗, t → ∞) contains individuals that transitioned earlier and
aged while remaining in the activist state, but also those who transitioned later. At older ages, the kernel in Eq. 6
decreases: individuals leave the activist pool in larger numbers than they will join it, so that ρ1(a, t→∞) decreases
from its maximum. A similar argument can be applied to ρ2(a, t→∞) which also peaks at age a > αR.
A more interesting case is shown in Fig. 6(b) where the chosen parameters are the same as in Fig. 5(b) and where
the de-activation rate CD is lower than what used in Fig. 6(a). In this case, the corresponding age-independent model
reaches a strong turmoil steady state. We observe that the radical population in Fig. 6(b) peaks near a ≃ 23, while
activists are bimodally distributed, peaking at both younger a ≃ 13, and older ages a ≃ 35. Of the two ρ1(a; t→∞)
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maxima, the first occurs at age a < αA. Here, due to the low value of CD, a large activist population rapidly emerges at
young ages; these individuals gradually transition towards the radical stage, and further increase R(a; ρ2). Eventually,
the radicalized population becomes so numerous that R(a; ρ2) overtakes the activation rate A(a; ρ1), causing activists
to vigorously transition to the radical pool, effectively leading to the net loss of activists around age a ≃ αA as seen
in Fig. 6(b). The first peak in ρ1(a, t → ∞) thus emerges at younger ages a < αA, when the number of radicals
is relatively low and so is R(a; ρ2). At intermediate ages a > αA, R(a; ρ2) begins to decline along with the radical
population ρ2(a, t → ∞), leading to an increase in the activist population ρ1(a, t → ∞). These individuals shift to
the non-activist pool at a slow rate as CD is relatively low. As older ages are approached activation further decreases,
ρ1(a, t → ∞) begins to decline and individuals increasingly return to the non-radical state. These two competing
age-dependent mechanisms give rise to the second peak in ρ1(a; t→∞) as seen in Fig. 6(b).
Finally, in Fig. 6(c) we show the age dependence of the steady state radical and activist populations using the same
parameters as in Fig. 5(c), where the age-independent model predicts mild turmoil. We find that activists peak at age
a∗ ≃ 19, while radicals reach their maximum at age a∗ ≃ 28. The mechanisms driving the observed age-dependent
patterns are similar to what described for Fig. 6(b), however here we do not observe a secondary peak for ρ2(a, t→∞).
In this case the de-activation rate CD = 0.9 is larger than what used in Fig. 6(b), where CD = 0.2. As a result, as
the radicalization rate R(a; ρ2) decreases at older ages, the large de-activation rate does not allow for an intermediate
activist population to persist, rather most of the former radicals turn directly to non-radical behavior. The activist
population declines continuously in age and does not exhibit a secondary maximum. Upon comparing Figs. 6(b) and
(c) we also see that while in the state of strong turmoil, adherents may remain active even at older ages when the
number of radical extremists vanishes. On the other hand, panel (c) shows that in cases of mild turmoil, the number
of radicals and activists is concentrated at early ages, suggesting that fervor wanes significantly with age.
We now consider the case of irreversible radicalization CP = 0 in Eqs. 1–6. In the previous subsection we showed
that in the age-independent case, the dynamics is strongly dependent on the radicalization rate; hence we begin by
illustrating the particular case of fixed CA = 12, CD = 5, and varying CR. We assume the same age parameters as
the reversible case above, where αA = αR = 20, and σA = σR = 10. Initial conditions are also chosen as above with
ρ0(a, 0) = 0.989, ρ1(a, 0) = 0.01, and ρ2(a, 0) = 0.001. Within the age-independent model, the above parameters
correspond to cA = 6, cD = 2.5 and cR = CR/2 and yield a stable turmoil state at (n
∗
0 = 5/6, n
∗
1 = 0, n
∗
2 = 1/6) and
an unstable dormant state at (n∗0 = 5/6, n
∗
1 = 1/6, n
∗
2 = 0); neither of these configurations depend on cR.
In Figs. 7(b) we increase CR = 2 (cR = 1), while keeping all other parameters unchanged. In the age-independent
formulation the system converges to turmoil at (n∗0 = 5/6, n
∗
1 = 0, n
∗
2 = 1/6) after roughly 60 years. The dynamics
are quite different in the age-dependent version of the model. Here, the activist fraction n1(t) rises and declines more
abruptly than in the age-independent case; similarly the radical fraction n2(t) increases at earlier times and more
vigorously, greatly surpassing the n∗2 = 1/6 steady state value of the age independent model at long times. Of particular
importance is the fact that age-dependent transitions allow the n1(t) activist population to exist continuously and
not vanish as it does in the age-independent case. This non-depleted pool of n1(t) radicals provides an uninterrupted
source of recruits for n2(t), which can grow to large values; it also provides a pathway for more n0(t) non-radicals to
be initiated into the radicalization process. Indeed, n0(t→∞) = 0.64 at steady state in the age-dependent model as
opposed to n∗0 = 5/6 = 0.83 in the age-independent case. These results show that age structure allows for a broad
influence of the activist population: age-differentiation allows activists to persist over different age windows and not
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FIG. 6: Age distribution of activists and radicals for the parameters used in Figs. 5(a)–(c). Panel (a) shows a small fraction
of radicals, deviating from the dormant steady state predicted by the age-independent model. Both activist and radical
populations peak at ages slightly larger than αR. Panel (b), corresponding to strong turmoil, shows the radical population
peaking at ages slightly larger than αR, accompanied by a bi-modal age-distribution of activists. Panel (c) corresponds to mild
turmoil and shows a uni-modal age distribution for both radicals and activists, with the radical peak occurring at ages larger
than αA and the activist maximum at ages lower than αA. The mechanisms that lead to uni-modal or bimodal distributions
as well as to the shifts in the peaks compared to αA are detailed in the text.
be depleted all at once by joining the radical pool. Thus, while still maturing towards full fledged radicalization,
activists keep recruiting members into their ranks through peer-pressure, continuously funneling individuals to the
radical state.
If we further increase CR = 50 (cR = 25), as shown in Figs. 7(c) we observe that, due to the very large radicalization
rate, the activist fraction n1(t) is quickly depleted even within the age-dependent model. The loss of the intermediate
activist population represents a bottleneck hindering radical population growth, as new members are no longer being
recruited. As a result, even with a higher radicalization rate, the n2(t→∞) steady states in this case are lower than in
Fig. 7(b) both in the age-dependent and age-independent models. In particular, in the age-independent formulation,
the system will irreversibly settle along the n∗0 + n
∗
2 = 1 solution family, and not at the turmoil state. On the other
hand, as can be seen in the dynamics of the age-dependent n2(t) in Fig. 7(c) the continuous presence of radicals
becomes unsustainable without activists supplying new recruits. Here, radicals eventually fade away due to old age
and are replaced by non-radicals, under the population conservation conditions assumed in our model. This depletion
slows the further radicalization of activists, who interact less with full fledged radicals, allowing n1(t) to recover, as
can be seen in the resurgent spike of activists in Fig. 7(c). The rise in n1(t) triggers the regrowth of n2(t), which once
again depletes the activist pool, leading to oscillations in n1(t) and n2(t) over time. During the second radicalization
wave (and other hypothetical ones beyond the 100 years considered in this panel) the n1(t), n2(t) populations reach
higher values than during the first, transient one. Interestingly, the emergence of activists is seen to precede that of
radicals by roughly five years, on the same time-scale as reported for a demographic study of individuals progressing
from initial radicalization to full extremism [17].
In Fig. 8, we plot long term population fractions ni(t = 100) for i = 1, 2 as a function of CR (cR = CR/2) for
the two formulations of our model. For low CR . 1, radical fractions n2(t = 100) are negligible while activist
populations n1(t = 100) remain close to metastable levels. These are slightly higher in the age-dependent case than in
the age-independent one, as discussed above. Increasing radicalization rates to moderate 1 . CR . 10 values drives
the age-independent model to the cR-independent turmoil steady state at (n
∗
0 = 5/6, n
∗
1 = 0, n
∗
2 = 1/6), where n
∗
1
vanishes. In contrast, within the age-dependent model n1(t = 100) decreases with increasing CR but stays non-zero,
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FIG. 7: Time dependence of the activist n1 and radical n2 populations from the age-independent and age-dependent formu-
lations of our model. We fix CA = 12 and CD = 5 and set CR = 0.5 in panel (a), CR = 2 in panel (b), and CR = 50 in
panel (c). Additional parameters for the age-dependent model are αA = αR = 20, σA = σR = 10. Initial conditions are
(ρ0(a, 0), ρ1(a, 0), ρ2(a, 0)) = (0.989, 0.01, 0.001). In all panels the activist population rises first, followed by radical growth. In
the age-independent case, n1(t), n2(t) saturate either at turmoil as shown in panels (a) and (b) or along the solution family as
shown in panel (c). Age-dependence slightly accelerates the growth of activists and radicals at low CR in panel (a); greatly
enhances the growth of radicals by maintaining a finite activist population at intermediate CR in panel (b); and leads to activist
and radical population oscillations at high CR in panel (c).
leading to a significantly elevated n2(t = 100) as discussed above. We find that there exists an optimal C
opt
R value that
maximizes n2(t = 100) in the age-dependent case. Values of CR that are too low hinder recruitment from the activist
pool; values of CR that are too large overtax, it leading to an optimal C
opt
R value. As CR & 10 is further increased,
n1(t = 100) continues to decline in the age-dependent model. Eventually the oscillatory regime is reached, as shown
in Fig. 8. The age-independent model does not exhibit oscillations for large CR, however n
∗
2 declines, indicating that
turmoil is no longer reached, and that the system settles along the solution family n∗0 + n
∗
2 = 1 as described at the
end of subsection IIIA.
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FIG. 8: Long-time n1(t = 100) and n2(t = 100) populations as a function of CR (cR = CR/2) for the age-independent and
age-dependent models. The CR values used in Fig. 7 are explicitly marked. At low CR, the radical population n2 is negligible,
and the activist population n1 saturates. At intermediate CR, the n2 radicals rise by converting more n1 activists. Note that
n1(t = 100) → 0 in the age-independent case, while in the age-dependent model n1(t = 100) remains finite and leads to an
enhanced radical population. At high CR, the age-structured model yields oscillatory dynamics as shown by the spiky curves.
In the age-independent model, n2(t = 100) declines as the system evolves towards the solution family n
∗
0 + n
∗
2 = 1 and away
from turmoil at n∗2 = 1/6.
In Fig. 9 we show the age distribution of activists and radicals at long times (t = 100) under irreversible radical-
ization CP = 0 using the same parameters as in Figs. 7(b) and (c). We do not display the age distribution profiles
corresponding to Fig. 7(a) since the system is not equilibrated at t = 100 and the age distribution curves would be
qualitatively similar to the short time ones corresponding to Fig. 7(b).
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FIG. 9: Age distribution of activists and radicals for the parameters used in Figs. 7(b) and (c). In panel (a) activists emerge
first and at t = 4.2 their age distribution is close to the dormant distribution ρd1(a). At long times (t = 100 years) radicals
surpass the activist population. Their age distribution increases at young ages and plateaus at older ones. A small fraction of
activists remains, peaking at ages younger than αA. Panel (b) depicts the age distributions during the transient phase of the
oscillatory regime. At t = 1.8 activists reach a maximum, and a small radical fraction emerges. At t = 10 and 20 the activist
population (not plotted) vanishes, while that of radicals increases. The age distribution of radicals maintains its shape as it
advects towards older ages. Panel (c) shows the age distributions of the oscillatory regime after the transient period. Behaviors
are qualitatively similar to panel (b). However, when activists reach a maximum at t = 61.7 years, the radical population
remains negligible, allowing activists to approach the dormant state and increasing the radical population at t = 70 and 80.
In Fig. 9(a) we use the same parameters as in Fig. 7(b). For the activist age distribution ρ1(a, t→∞) a peak arises
at age a∗ < αA and the distribution is similar to what observed in Fig. 6(c) under reversible radicalization. Although
the parameters are different, the mechanism leading to the early maximum in Fig. 9(a) is the same as what outlined
when discussing Fig. 6(c): namely activists quickly joining the rank of radicals as they mature, yielding an early
age peak. In contrast, due to the irreversible nature of radicalization, the age distribution of radicals ρ2(a, t → ∞)
increases continuously until a plateau is reached since, once radicalized, individuals can only age within the extremist
pool but not deradicalize.
In Fig. 9(a) we also plot the age distributions at t = 4.2 when the fraction of activists n2(t = 4.2) is at the maximum
value shown in Fig. 7(b). For comparison, we also show the ρd1(a) distribution obtained by forcing ρ2(a, t) = 0 while
numerically solving Eqs. 1–6. Since this constraint allows only non-radicals and activists to arise, ρd1(a) may be used
as a proxy for the age distribution of activists at the dormant state; we can also interpret ρd1(a) as the age-dependent
analogue of the dormant solution discussed for the age-independent model in subsection IIIA. As can be seen from
Fig. 9(a), the ρ1(a, t = 4.2) and ρ
d
1(a) distributions are almost identical, suggesting that the system transitions through
the dormant state while evolving from utopia to turmoil, similarly as to what observed in the age-independent case,
as discussed in Fig. 3(c). As mentioned above, the age distributions corresponding to Fig. 7(a) at t = 100 would look
qualitatively similar to ρi(a, t = 4.2) for i = 1, 2 in Fig. 9(a).
The parameters used in Fig. 7(c) lead to oscillatory behavior. Since a long-term steady state cannot be identified
we plot the age distributions at times of interest. We begin with t = 1.8 when the activist population reaches its
first maximum, corresponding to the early peak in Fig. 7(c), and the radical population has increased to appreciable
values. In Fig. 9(b) the age distributions for both populations peak near ages a ≃ αA = αR = 20, with ρ1(a, t =
1.8)≪ ρ2(a, t = 1.8) for all ages. At later times, as the number of radicals increases, the number of activists decreases
to almost extinction. In Fig. 9(b) we also plot ρ2(a, t = 10) and ρ2(a, t = 20). Their shape is almost identical and
ρ2(a, t = 20) ≃ ρ2(a+10, t = 10) since within this time-frame radicals can only age, but neither increase nor decrease,
as the activist pool is depleted, and radicalization is irreversible. Eventually, at a = a1, radicals age out of the system,
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repopulating first the non-radical, and subsequently the activist pool. A second oscillation cycle begins.
In Fig. 9(c) we plot the age distributions beginning at t = 61.7, when the activist fraction reaches the second
maximum shown in Fig. 7(c). Here the radical population is vanishingly small while the activist age-distribution is
very close to that of dormant state. The two behaviors at t = 1.8 and t = 61.7 are different, due to initial conditions.
In particular, we note that at the onset even the small, uniform, radical population ρ2(a, t = 0) = 0.001 is able to
funnel non-radicals towards full fledged extremism, bypassing the dormant state. A large number of radicals quickly
consolidates. This initial condition effect damps away after a transient period, when the number of radicals declines
due to aging and the non-radical population is replenished. As the cycle begins anew with almost no radicals, the
system is able to reach the dormant state, with a large activist population. Eventually the latter radicalize, yielding
the age distribution ρ2(a, t = 70) depicted in Fig. 9(c). The above dynamics show that while at short times the initial
radical population serves as a conduit to early, large scale radicalization, it also causes the rapid depletion of the
activist pool, until recruits are no longer available, halting further radicalization. On the other hand, in the second
cycle, with a vanishingly small initial radical population, activists are better able to increase their ranks and in turn
to sustain a continuous transition towards the final radical stage. Indeed, the total number of radicals in the second
cycle from both Fig. 7(c) and and Fig. 9(c) is much larger than in the first cycle. The early emergence of radicals may
thus be counterproductive. Advection is still observed as ρ2(a, t = 80) ≃ ρ2(a+ 10, t = 70).
We now examine how other parameters influence the long-term radical population. In Fig. 10(a) we plot n2(t = 100)
as a function of CA/CD and CR/CD. In general, CA/CD is seen to dictate whether a radical population may ever arise,
while CR/CD determines long time behavior and whether a steady or an oscillatory state is reached. The n2(t = 100)
population increases with increasing CA/CD and reaches a maximum at CR/CD ≃ 0.5 regardless of CA/CD. As
discussed above, n2(t = 100) has not reached steady state for smaller CR/CD and is hampered by over-drainage of
the activist pool for larger CR/CD. Finally for large CR/CD oscillatory behavior arises, as indicated by the striped
pattern in the upper-right portion of Fig. 10(a). Reducing CA/CD hinders the activation of non-radicals and may be
considered a prevention strategy; in contrast, reducing CR/CD impedes full radicalization and may be considered a
correctional strategy. The results from Fig. 10(a) suggest that prevention may be more effective than correction. To
convey this point, we highlight a line of constant CA/CD +CR/CD = 4 to represent a scenario where total escalation
rates rates are constant but can be preferentially directed towards activation or radicalization. Under this constraint,
lowest values of n2(t = 100) are found by decreasing CA/CD; although the corresponding radicalization rate is large,
the activist pool is too small to yield a sizable radical population.
Fig. 10(b) shows the steady state radical population as a function of αA and αR. The maximum of n2(t = 100) is
located at αA ≃ 17 and αR ≃ 38, suggesting that radicalization is most pronounced when non-radicals are activated
in their late teens and the resultant activist pool is given ample time to develop. The large age difference between αA
and αR allows the age stratified activists to most effectively funnel non-radicals to the radical pool. Although such
large values of αR are not realistic Fig. 10(b) implies that, given an activation age αA, the number of radicals increases
with radicalization age αR, allowing the activist pool to keep sustaining radical growth. This growth continues until
αR reaches large values (here, roughly 40), when the various populations no longer overlap in age, and the interaction
kernel K(a, a′;αR, σR) loses its effectiveness.
So far we have analyzed expected outcomes over long times. In particular, we find that age-dependence allows
for the asymptotic emergence of utopia, a dormant state and turmoil, just as in the age-independent formulation.
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FIG. 10: Long-time n2(t = 100) radical population as a function of CA/CD and CR/CD in panel (a) and αA and αR in panel
(b). In panel (a) n2(t = 100) is negligible until CA/CD & 2, after which it increases. As a function of CR/CD, n2(t = 100) peaks
at CR/CD ≃ 0.5; further increases lead to a decline and to oscillatory behavior. In panel (b) n2(t = 100) peaks at αA ≃ 15 and
αR ≃ 35. Starting from the maximum, n2(t = 100) drops sharply by increasing αR and gradually by increasing αA. Unless
being varied, parameters are CD = 5, CA = 12, CR = 8, αA = αR = 20, and σA = σR = 10.
However, the basins of attraction of these steady states and the associated populations may differ greatly in the two
formulations. For example, the strong promotion of radicalization at early ages may lead to a premature draining
of the activist pool, effectively thwarting further radicalization. In this context, the radical ideology spreads too
quickly among a few who become isolated from the rest of society and who are not able to effectively recruit more
adherents through peer-pressure at the intermediate, activist stage. Most notably, in certain parameter regimes,
age-structure allows for cyclic behavior to arise, with alternating waves of more or less radicalized individuals. The
above described trends often arise over several years, when the system has equilibrated. In more practical situations,
however, interventions may have been introduced earlier, before reaching the above steady state predictions. We thus
turn our attention to short-time phenomena, at the onset of an escalating situation.
C. Short-time behavior
As outlined in the previous subsection, starting from a quasi-utopia initial configuration, the dynamics of the system
evolves over two stages. Activists emerge first and reach a metastable, finite population; radicals remain few. In the
second phase, activists turn into radicals, and the metastable state is dissipated. In this subsection we use perturbation
theory to examine the onset of the activist population from an initial non-radical society and the onset of the radical
population from the activist pool.
We begin by perturbing utopia, defined as ρi(a) = 1 for i = 0 and ρi(a) = 0 for i = 1, 2 and examine how
trajectories depart from it. An age-dependent perturbation around utopia can be expressed as ρ1(a, t) = δρ1(a, t),
ρ2(a, t) = δρ2(a, t), and ρ0(a, t) = 1− δρ1(a, t)− δρ2(a, t), where δρ1(a, t), δρ2(a, t)≪ 1 are small perturbations. The
age structures at t = 0 are given as δρi(a, t = 0) for i = 1, 2. Upon linearizing the system to first order we find that
for short times
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FIG. 11: Perturbations around utopia. (a) Activist growth rate λu as a function of CA/CD and σA. The eigenvalue λu
decreases with increasing CA/CD and decreasing σA, suggesting that kernels tightly clustered in age magnify the instability
of utopia. (b) The age-differentiated growth amplitude φu1(a), the eigenfunction corresponding to λu, for various σA with
CA/CD = 2.4 and αA = 20. As σA increases, the peak of φ
u
1 (a) shifts towards a > αA and its width increases as described in
the text. For even larger σA, φ
u
1 (a) is quasi-constant with the exception of the region a ≃ a0, where the boundary condition
suppresses activist growth by enhancing the non-radical pool. Unless being varied, parameters are CA = 12, CD = 5, CR = 5,
αA = 20.
∂δρ1
∂t
+
∂δρ1
∂a
= A(a; δρ1)− CDδρ1, (15)
∂δρ2
∂t
+
∂δρ2
∂a
= 0, (16)
where A(a; δρ1) is given by Eq. 4. The perturbations do not contribute to the boundary condition in Eq. 7 since their
sum is zero by construction. Eq. 16 implies that δρ2(a, t) retains its original age structure and is simply advected in
time. The radical population remains small for short times as expected. Since it is linear in δρ1, Eq. 15 can be recast
in terms of an age-dependent operator L(a) defined as
∂δρ1
∂t
= L(a)δρ1. (17)
The growth of an initially infinitesimally small δρ1(a, t) can be approximated as δρ1(t, a) ∼ exp(λut)φ
u
1(a), where
λu is the largest eigenvalue arising from Eqs. 17 and φ
u
1(a) is its corresponding eigenfunction. We can interpret λu
as the onset growth rate of activists: λu < 0 implies a regression of activists towards utopia and characterizes the
perturbations as unstable, whereas λu > 0 indicates departure from utopia and characterizes the perturbations as
stable. Unless otherwise stated or varied, parameters are chosen here as CA = 12, CD = 5, CR = 2, σA = σR = 10,
αA = αR = 20, as used in Fig. 7(b). We numerically compute the largest eigenvalue λu and its corresponding
eigenfunction φu1 (a) using the power method [44–46]. Here, the given operator is applied to an arbitrary initial
function, the result is normalized and the result, and iteratively multiplying the operator to the normalized result
until the normalized result converges.
In Fig. 11(a) we plot λu as a function of CA/CD and σA, the relative intensity and width of the activation rate.
For low values of CA/CD, λu is negative: perturbations vanish and utopia is stable. Higher values of CA/CD lead
18
to positive λu and to large scale instabilities. The marginal stability line at λu = 0 separates the two regimes. The
unstable region expands with decreasing σA, suggesting that non-zero activist configurations may be more easily
reached by narrowing the age range in the interaction kernel K(a, a′;αA, σA), while at the same time increasing its
peak by construction. Larger σA values spread the kernel over a large age range, resulting in a modest peak that may
not be enough to sustain activist growth. As expected, λu increases with CA/CD. Other parameters αA, CR, σR and
αR have negligible effects.
The eigenfunction φu1(a) represents the age-differentiated growth amplitude of activists and is shown in Fig. 11(b)
for three σA values. As is evident for increasing αA, φ
u
1(a) peaks at a & αA, not at a = αA. This can be explained by
recalling that activist populations increase with age, since we initiate our system from a quasi-utopia state, and since
our chosen boundary conditions in Eqs. 7 and 8 preferentially repopulate the non radical state at age a = a0. Since the
interaction kernel K(a, a′;αA, σA) favors interactions between same-age individuals, non-radical early adults, slightly
older than a = αA, are more likely to interact with activists of their same age than with non-radicals, as activists
are simply more numerous at this age. Hence, there is a higher likelihood that young non-radical adults older than
a = αA become activated due to societal interactions. The peak of φ
u
1 (a) is shifted further to the right as the range of
social interactions increases, that is, for larger values of σA. Of course, this outcome depends on the specific choice for
K(a, a′;αA, σA). Finally, as can be seen, φ
u
1(a) becomes wider and shallower with increasing σA, until, for σA → ∞,
φu1(a≫ a0) is constant, except for φ
u
1(a ≃ a0), where boundary conditions pin it close to zero.
In the unstable case, when λu > 0, perturbations around utopia grow and drive the system towards the dormant
steady state. Note that φu1(a) shown in Fig. 11(b) for σA = 10 and ρ
d
1(a) shown in Fig. 9(c) have similar profiles,
suggesting that as the system evolves from utopia to the dormant state, the φu1(a) eigenfunctions grow uniformly
towards ρd1(a).
At longer times, the system leaves the dormant region and progresses towards the turmoil state. We similarly
investigate the short-term behavior of this process using perturbation analysis. In particular, we reset time so that at
t = 0 the system is in the dormant state and model small fluctuations as ρ1(t, a) = ρ
d
1(a)+δρ1(t, a), ρ2(t, a) = δρ2(t, a),
and ρ0(t, a) = 1 − ρ
d
1(a) − δρ1(t, a) − δρ2(t, a), where the perturbations δρ1(a, t), δρ2(a, t) ≪ 1 for all ages and for
short times. Upon substitution into Eqs. 1-3, and linearizing to first order we find
∂δρ1
∂t
+
∂δρ1
∂a
= −A(a; ρd1) (δρ1 + δρ2)− CDδρ1 (18)
+A(a; δρ1)
(
1− ρd1
)
−R(a; δρ2)ρ
d
1 ,
∂δρ2
∂t
+
∂δρ2
∂a
= R(a; δρ2)ρ
d
1 . (19)
As done above, we also approximate the growth of the perturbation near the dormant state as δi(t, a) ≃ exp(λdt)φ
d
i (a),
where λd is the largest eigenvalue of the operator stemming from Eqs. 18 and 19 and represents the growth rate of
radicals near the dormant state. The corresponding eigenfunctions are φdi (a) with i = 1, 2.
In Fig. 12(a) we plot λd as a function of CR/CD and σA. As can be seen, the dormant state is always unstable:
in the absence of a pacification mechanism, radicals will never return to the activist stage. In Fig. 12(b) we analyze
the dependence of λd on αR and αA. We find that λd reaches a maximum for αR & αA, at approximately the same
age when the activist distribution in the dormant state φd1(a) also reaches a maximum. Thus, radicalization may
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FIG. 12: Perturbations around the dormant state. (a) Radical growth rate λd as a function of CR/CD and σR. The dormant
state is mostly unstable since λd is always positive. (b) Radical growth rate λd as a function of αA and αR. λd is greatest near
the αA = αR line. Small patches of stable regimes occur when αR and αA differ greatly. (c) Normalized growth patterns of
activists φ1(a), and radicals, φ2(a). Radicals increase at the expense of activists, since φ2(a) > 0 and φ1(a) < 0. Unless varied,
parameters are CA = 12, CR = 8, αA,R = 20, σA,R = 10, CD = 5, σD →∞.
be greatly enhanced by targeting the ages corresponding to the largest activist population. It is interesting to note
that the long-term behavior of n2(t = 100) and the short-term radical growth rate λd depend on αA and αR in very
different ways, as can be seen by comparing Figs. 10(b) and 12(b). At short times, Fig. 12(b) shows that λd is largest
for αR ≃ αA; at longer times, 10(b) reveals that n2(t = 100) is largest for αR > αA. These results indicate that
although the instability is initially largest when the two target ages are similar, the choice of αR ≃ αA drains the
activist pool too quickly for radicals to achieve long term growth. Radical populations are largest when the two target
ages are different allowing for the age-structured interactions to optimally funnel populations to the radical state.
In Fig. 12(d) we compute the eigenfunctions φd1(a) and φ
d
2(a) for CR/CD = 0.4, with the other parameters as
detailed above. These eigenfunctions represent the age-differentiated growth amplitudes of activists and radicals,
respectively. Numerically, we find λd = 0.37. A positive φ
d
2(a) and a negative φ
d
1(a) emerge, indicating growing
radical and decreasing activist populations, as expected. However, φd2(a) does not exactly match −φ
d
1(a): the latter
exceeds the former at young ages, implying that a fraction of activists returns to the non-radical status. At old
ages φd2(a) exceeds −φ
d
1(a), suggesting that non-radicals are activated, and subsequently radicalized, spurring further
radicalization. As the system evolves away from utopia or the dormant state, a governmental agency may intervene
to stem radicalization through age-based educational or rehabilitation programs. In the next section, we explore the
effects of age-dependent intervention.
IV. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
To study the effects of government sponsored programs, we consider a population that undergoes radicalization from
an initial utopia and irreversibly. We model intervention in the form of age-dependent conversion terms that lower
extremist levels incrementally, converting radicals to activists, or activists to non-radicals. We thus re-write the
previously uniform de-escalating terms CD and CP = 0 in Eqs. 1–3
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CD → CD + µG(a), (20)
CP = 0→ (1 − µ)G(a), (21)
where 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 determines how efforts are divided between the two possible intervention avenues. Relatively large
µ implies that most resources are focused on returning activists to the non-radical state, while more modest µ values
represent intervention in returning radicals to the activist state. The age dependent term G(a) is modeled similarly
to the interaction kernels in Eq. 6
G(a) = CG
exp
[
−
(αG − a)
2
2σ2G
]
∫ a¯
−a¯
exp
[
−
s2
2σ2G
]
ds
. (22)
Here, CG represents the intensity of intervention, and αG and σG are the corresponding target age and spread. To
quantify the effectiveness of intervention, we introduce a radical suppression ratio Ψ ≡ nG2 (t→∞)/n
T
2 (t→∞) where
nT2 (t→∞) is the steady state radical fraction at turmoil arising from Eqs. 1–6 and n
G
2 (t→∞) is similarly evaluated
except for the government intervention substitutions in Eqs. 20 and 21. To be concrete, we select societal parameters
as in Figs. 7 and 8, CA = 12, CD = 5, αA = αR = 20, σA = σR = 10, initial conditions ρ0(a, 0) = 0.989, ρ1(a, 0) = 0.01,
ρ2(a, 0) = 0.001, and vary CR. Since Ψ is meaningful only if n
G
2 (t →∞) and n
T
2 (t → ∞) converge to unique values,
we limit the CR ≤ 10, before the oscillatory regime shown in Fig. 8 is reached. Government intervention is introduced
once society has reached steady state.
As expected, Ψ decreases with CG, indicating that larger intervention leads to the emergence of less radicals.
In Fig. 13(a) we fix CG = 1, αG = αR = αA, σG = σR = σA, and plot Ψ as a function of µ and CR. For
small values of CR, Ψ decreases with µ; the trend is reversed for large CR. This suggests that if the push towards
radicalization is mild, at low CR, the most effective intervention is to aim resources at pacification, returning radicals
to the activist state. Decreasing the number of radicals will lessen their influence on potential recruits. Vice-versa,
for strong radicalization under large CR, the optimal strategy is to encourage activists to return to the non-radical
stage, preventing radicalization at its incipit. We also note that Ψ increases with CR, indicating that the more
aggressive radicalization is, the harder it is to suppress radicals. Finally, when CR is large and µ→ 0, Ψ can increase
beyond unity: government intervention enhances radicalization. The mechanism behind this unwanted outcome is
that fostering the return of radicals towards the activist state yields a much enlarged activist pool that is able to
recruit more non-radicals into the process. The net result is that the number of radicals will increase. This effect is
magnified for large CR, when activists quickly turn into radicals, and the activist pool becomes a scarcely populated
bottleneck. Government intervention enlarges the activist pool, alleviating the bottleneck, and fortuitously aiding the
conversion of radicals. We do not observe the same result at small CR since there is no bottleneck and activists are
quite numerous even before intervention.
In Figs. 13(b) and (c) we set CR = 10 and CG = 5 and plot Ψ as a function of the characteristic ages αG and
σG for µ = 0 in panel (b) and µ = 1 in panel (c). Only values of σG . 10 affect Ψ, which may be expected since
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FIG. 13: Government intervention. (a) Radical suppression ratio Ψ as a function of µ and CR for αG = αA,R and σG = σA,R.
For strong radicalization (large CR) Ψ decreases when µ increases, suggesting that activist prevention is more effective. For
mild radicalization (low CR), radical prevention is more advantageous. (b) Radical suppression ratio Ψ as a function of αG and
σG through the pacification of radicals, µ = 0. Optimal reduction of radicals is achieved for αG > αA,R = 20. Intervention may
be counterproductive for targeted ages αG < αA,R = 20. (c) Radical suppression ratio Ψ as a function of αG and σG through
the de-escalation of activists, µ = 1. Optimal reduction of radicals is achieved for αG < αA,R = 20. Unless varied, parameter
values are CA = 12, CR = 10, CD = 5, αA,R = 20, σA,R = 10, and CG = 1 for (a) and 5 for (b) and (c).
the age-dependent model converges to the age-independent one as σG → ∞. In Fig. 13(b), where µ = 0, Ψ > 1 for
15 . αG . 25 and αA = 20, implying government intervention is counterproductive, as outlined above. Vice-versa, Ψ
is lowest for 30 . αG . 45 when radicals who return to the activist pool interact less with younger non-radicals. In
Fig. 13(c), where µ = 1, Ψ < 1 for all values of αG and σG and its lowest value is within 15 . αG . 25.
V. DISCUSSION
Several population dynamics models have been proposed to study multi-stage radicalization [25–27, 29, 30, 32]. Our
work shows that including age dependence, even in the simplest form of interactions between populations, can lead
to rich dynamics, enhancing radicalization in certain parameter regimes, and leading to oscillatory behavior. Age-
independent radicalization models generally converge to fixed ratios among populations and phase portraits do not
display limit cycles [25, 30], as shown here for the age-independent formulation of our model. Yet, according to one
of the most influential theories of terrorism, developed by the political scientist D. C. Rapoport, extremist tendencies
rise and fall over time like waves or ripples [33, 47–49]. Our age structured model provides a potential mechanism
to explain such wave-like behavior. In particular, we predict oscillatory solutions when i) radicalization is aggressive
(CR is large), and ii) radicalization is irreversible (CP = 0). As shown in Fig. 7(c), the typical timescale for sustained
radical populations is roughly 40 years, in agreement with sociological observations [33, 47–50]. The lifetime of these
radical states depends on the age interval [a0, a1] within which existing radicals are able to convert non-radicals. This
finding supports Rapoport’s conjecture that extremists radicalize a generation of individuals, and when their influence
fades due to aging, the cycle of terrorism comes to an end [33, 48]. Recent studies using data analysis to quantitatively
inspect Rapoport’s wave theory have observed a relatively shorter lifespan of about 30 years for the so-called “New
Left” terrorist wave emerging from Marxist movements [50]. This observation is consistent with a smaller effective
age interval of influence in our model, and can be justified by noting that Marxism is a relatively more sophisticated
ideology, compared to religious or nationalist fanaticism. Indoctrination of younger individuals may thus be less
effective, since their understanding of socioeconomic issues may still be under development. Quantitative studies have
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been facilitated by the creation of dedicated databases to index terrorist related data starting from the 1960s [51, 52].
Prior records are sparse and the data is not sufficient for quantitative analysis of radical resurgence within a society
and over long periods of time, as would be required to validate the existence of generational waves predicted by our
model. Global data, such as fatalities in conflicts over the past several centuries do exhibit oscillatory patterns with
a period of roughly half a century [53]; however lumping together data from various parts of the world may not be
directly applicable to our model, due to the great regional variability and the limited information spread of centuries
past. From a more qualitative perspective, religious driven conflicts seem to display signs of ebbs and flows throughout
history at regional scales. For examples, the 13th century Crusades in Europe were followed by the Renaissance, a
relatively peaceful era, and again by the 16th century protestant Reformation wars. Similarly, in the Middle East,
the 19th century Islamic revival inspired anti-colonial wars; religious leaders were later replaced by secular authorities
who ruled for most of the 20th century, until they were toppled or threatened by religious movements. Notably the
worldwide decline of religious influence in the 20th century even led to the once prominent “secularization” theory
[54–56], according to which religions would continue fading and eventually disappear. However, religious fanaticism
has returned with a vengeance in recent decades [55, 56]. Oscillatory phenomena can sometimes be observed within
long-lasting conflicts, such as the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians, although counter-measures implemented
in response to specific incidents can contribute to some short-term fluctuations as well [57]. Admittedly the real world
is much more complicated than our model, and the evolution of human society will involve other factors that are
not included in Eqs. 1–6. Notwithstanding, the oscillatory solutions of our model under fixed conversion intensities
CA/R/D suggest the possibility of resurgence for a declining or even inactive ideological movement, provided that the
underlying sociological contexts persist over time.
In addition to cyclic behavior, we also find that age-structure increases the sensitivity of the dynamics to parameter
values. For example, in Fig. 8 the long-time radical fraction n2(t = 100) derived in the age-dependent model is nearly
doubled by doubling CR from 1 to 2, while the corresponding age-independent n2(t = 100) stays uniform. Moreover,
as can be seen in Fig. 10(b) the age-dependent n2(t = 100) is highly sensitive to shifts in αA and αR, even if the
magnitudes of the rates stay unchanged. These results indicate that age-dependent radicalization models can lead
to more volatility and to more complex behavior compared to the more straightforward predictions arising from age-
independent models. These nuances imply that governments can greatly improve the outcome of their interventions
by targeting the right age groups, rather than treating all ages the same way.
Finally, we find that the most effective tactic to reduce the radical population is to prevent activation by decreasing
CA as shown in Fig. 10(a). From a practical perspective, this may be achieved by reducing the factors that lead to
the activation of non-radicals through education, hope for the future, employment. Sometimes however, this may not
be possible and eliminating escalating factors for one group may lead another to radicalize. An alternate, corrective
approach, may be to de-activate the activist population or to pacify radicals.
In cases where radicalization is very aggressive, the optimal intervention strategy is to reduce the number of activists,
effectively isolating the most extreme from the general non-radical public. However, when radicalization is moderate,
although the number of radicals is relatively small, a large body of activists will emerge, in response to an ideology
that may be justified among the general public. In this case, the best intervention strategy is to focus on pacification,
reducing the numbers of those who have taken the ideology to extreme levels. Current intervention policies are of two
types: stopping extremists who are about to engage in violent activities, while allowing all freedom of speech is known
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as the “Anglo-Saxon” approach; preventing the spread of extreme views before violence arises is the “European”
approach [58]. We can loosely interpret the choice of µ = 0 in our intervention protocol to represent the Anglo-Saxon
approach, where radicals are targeted, while µ = 1 corresponds to the European approach, where the de-escalation
of activists is sought. Our results suggest that discerning which strategy is best may depend on the aggressiveness of
the radicalization process, embodied by CR.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced a multi-stage radicalization model with age-structured progression rates. Upon comparison
with the corresponding age-independent formulation, we find that age dependence leads to more complex, parameter-
sensitive dynamics. In many cases, especially for irreversible radicalization, age dependence enhances the number of
irreducible radicals. For large radicalization rates, age structure leads to oscillatory behavior, where large fractions of
extremists ebb and flow over a lifetime of roughly 40 to 50 years. While the enhanced parameter sensitivity implies
higher risks for escalation, it also provides an opportunity for effective policy making, for example by surgically
targeting more susceptible age groups. Upon comparing different government intervention strategies, we find that
de-activation, i.e. returning mildly indoctrinated individuals to the non-radical state, leads to more suppression of
extremists when the radicalization rate is high. In the opposite case, the pacification of radicals may produce better
results. Despite the great simplicity of the mathematical model, we observe a wide range of dynamical behaviors
simply by distributing the strength of social interactions differently over age, without including more complicated
external factors, such as the evolution of socioeconomic contexts or the change of political regimes. Sociologically our
findings suggest that the heterogeneity of social interactions among different age groups can profoundly change the
course of progression, e.g., the longevity and the pinnacle point, of an ideology within a population. Fundamentally
distinctive phenomena can be overlooked if the effect of age structure is neglected and all age groups are lumped into
a uniform population. It is particularly interesting to note that the lifespan of radical activities in our oscillatory
scenarios quantitatively agree with the observed time scale in the wave theory of terrorism [33, 48, 50]. Our model
further suggests the potential for a past terrorist wave to resurge even after a long period of dormancy, unless the
sociological contexts underlying the previous wave is sufficiently reduced to ensure the stability of a peaceful utopia.
Our model includes only three linear stages of radicalization. In particular, all non-violent steps are condensed in
the intermediate activist stage, between the general non-radical population and the violence-prone extremists. We
may increase the number of stages as done in previous age-independent work [12–17] for a more nuanced progression
to radicalization, but we expect qualitatively similar results to what showed here for a linear pathway. Our model may
be best used to approximate a slowly evolving society, where the populations are given sufficient time to relax toward
quasistatic conditions, allowing higher order interactions, say, between ρ0 and ρ2, to dampen away, and a unique,
primary pathway to emerge. Our findings can be very different from those arising in more dynamical situations where
multiple pathways exist to radicalization, or more than two stages are nonlinearly coupled in an interaction. For
example, social interactions may exhibit “history” dependence, where the likelihood of radicalization may depend
on the entire sequence of past states. Such history dependence may be directly incorporated in the transition rates
between radicalization stages [59], or through the notion of social reinforcement, where transitions require multiple
stimulations [60].
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Furthermore, we assumed a constant total population with a uniform age distribution, and have not included birth
and death events [39]. Also not included is the possibility of forcefully removing individuals from the radical or activist
pools, via arrest or involuntary exile. Neglecting birth and death may be a more suitable assumption for developed
countries [61], but for developing countries, especially in war-torn regions, birth and death rates are high and not
balanced. Birth and death are known to have profound impact on the age structure of the overall population, leading
to non-uniform age distributions [38, 39, 62]. Previous studies have connected the development of civil conflicts
with a particular type of non-uniform age distributions known as the “youth bulge” where the population consists
of disproportionately large youth cohorts [21, 63, 64]. It is believed that youth bulge may intensify the competition
for resource and employment opportunities, further exacerbating feelings of disaffection among the young [65–68].
The effect of age-dependent birth and death have been studied under the same McKendrick-von Foerster framework
presented here for various biological and ecological applications [34–39, 62] and can be added as an extension of our
model to investigate youth bulge or related phenomena. While incorporating birth and death is beyond the scope
of this paper, our current study can be used as a baseline for age-dependent social interactions, upon which further
complexities may be added to describe more realistic scenarios.
Lastly we present only the long-term outcome of government intervention policies, discussing what strategies may
achieve the best results, regardless of implementation cost. Given limited resources, the best strategy may not always
be possible, so a utility function should be derived to seek an optimal balance between the cost of intervention and the
gain from the prevention of radicalization. For example, a time-dependent utility function may allow the government
to dynamically adjust its strategy based on past outcomes [28, 69].
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